THE increasing tendency to specialization in medicine is apt at times unduly to restrict our outlook, so that we do not observe how widespread is the range of an apparently limited subject, how manifold are its phases, and how interwoven it is with other matters, political, historical and sociological. It may be profitable, therefore, to call attention once again to a particular aspect of the matter, namely, the elucidation of psychiatric problems in biography and history. It is an aspect which has not received, or did not formerly receive, as much attention in this country as in France, from psychiatrists and historians. One of the first, if not actually the first, of medical writers to apply the methods of morbid psychology in this way was a distinguished alienist, L6lut (1804-1877), whose monograph on the "Demon of Socrates " appeared in 1836. Lelut maintained that Socrates and other men of genius must be judged by the same rules by which ordinary individuals are judged, and that, when this is done, it becomes clear that there were times when they were mentally disordered. As may well be imagined these iconoclastic statements evoked a storm of criticism, but L6lut did not recant. Nearly twenty years later, when writing the preface to the second edition of the "Demon of Socrates," he recalls the words of Galileo (eppur si mtove), and says that he has seen no reason to alter his opinion as to the essential accuracy of his earlier statements. Yet, as he remarks, epigrammatically, "actual truth is not admitted truth": and that obiter dictutm is surely just as applicable to-day.
Another distinguished French alienist, Brierre de Boismont (1798-1881), published his very able and learned work "On Hallucinations" in 1845.
Although he adduced many instances of hallucinations occurring in famous individuals, he was not inclined to go as far as L6lut in regarding them as indubitable signs of mental disorder-though he does speak of Lelut as one who "may justly be regarded as at the head of that school which has proclaimed the intervention of physiology in history." De Boismont's attitude may be understood from the following quotations. "The facts of psychology," he says, " differ from those of physiology; each of them is governed by separate laws. If their mysterious union establishes certain points of contact, still their nature is distinct: the one is impalpable, the other tangible." Again, " But the senses are not the only sources of our ideas; there are others which originate in the soul itself, or are derived from God; these are general notions, ideas pure, which cannot be imagined and cannot become the subjects of hallucinations"; and, finally, "All our arguments are especially intended to show that these illustrious persons were the impersonation of an epoch, of some special idea; that they fulfilled some useful and necessary mission, and that their hallucinations were altogether different from those which are observed in the present day." ' (He refers here to Loyola, Luther and Joan of Arc.)
In the same way he drew a distinction " in favour of those apparitions which have been recorded in Scripture." It may be admitted that such distinctions justified the criticism levelled at him of being an eclectic, for such differentiation seems to leave the way open to deciding entirely in accordance with personal predilection. It is not a method that would have appealed to one at least of his medical predecessors, La Mettrie, who was an uncompromising materialist. His works, " The Natural History of the Soul " (1746) and "Man a Machine " (1748), incurred so much obloquy that he had to flee first to Holland and later to the friendly territory of Frederick the Great-whom it was difficult to shock by any display of scepticism and who was soon to entertain the almost equally sceptical Voltaire. Though it may be that La Mettrie was unduly dogmatic, he did bring sound common sense to bear upon problems which were then-and have been since-treated far too much from an abstract point of view. La Mettrie was in the tradition of Bacon, as may be gatbered from the following quotation: " Experiments and observation alone ought to guide us here. These we find in abundance in the writings of such physicians as were philosophers, and not in those philosophers who were unacquainted with physic. The former have explored and unravelled the labyrinth of Man. They alone have discovered to us those hidden springs concealed under a cover which hides from us so many wonders. They alone, in a philosophical contemplation of the soul, have a thousand times surprised it in its misery and grandeur; without despising it in one of these conditions or idolizing it in the other. Once more, I will be bold to say, these are the only authors that lave a right to speak on this subject. What would other lame philosophers say, and above all, the divines ? Is it not ridiculous to hear them determine without modesty on a subject they have never been qualified to examine thoroughly? A subject from which they have been always diverted by dark idle studies that have tinctured them with a thousand gross, childish prejudices, and to say all in one word, have plunged them over head and ears in fanaticism, which adds still to their ignorance in the mechanism of bodies." 4 This is plain speaking, and little wonder is it that he had to flee the country! Yet there were others who felt that the time had arrived when an endeavour had to be made to shake themselves free from the 3 " On Hallu-cinatiolns: A History and Explanation of Apparitions, Visions, Dreams, etc.," by A. Brierre de Boismoit. Translated by Robert T. Hulme. London, 1859. Pp. 4, 15, 362. 4 " Man a Machine," by M. de 13 Mettrie. (English Translation. London, 1750, p. 5.) trammels of a hide-bound tradition. Diderot and his collaborators were busy with the production of their great Encyclopaedia, the first volume of which appeared in 1751. There can, too, be little aoubt that the ideas of Descartes had a far-reaching effect. To him, man and the lower animals were automata, though in the case of man there was super-added a mind or soul; and discretion alone prevented him from carrying his system to those conclusions which later thinkers found inevitable. The Church-especially as represented by the Jesuits-was then very powerful; and, indeed, the works of Descartes were placed on the Roman Index. 5
To return to La Mettrie: "It is true," he says, "that melancholy, bile, phlegm, blood, etc., according to the nature, quantity, and different mxture of these humours, not only produce differences in different men, but also render every individual different from what he was, before particular changes were induced in his fluids." " In diseases the soul is sometimes as it were eclipsed, and shows no sign of existence: sometimes one would say it was doubled, so far does passion transport it; sometimes its weakness vanishes, and a fool by the recovery of health, becomes a man of sense. Sometimes the noblest genius in the world sinks into stupidity and never after recovers. Farewell, then, to all those noble acquisitions of learning obtained with so much labour! "
In another passage he asks: "What was it that could change the intrepidity of Caius Julius, Seneca and Petronius into pusillanimity and cowardice? An obstruction in the spleen, the liver, or some disorder in the venaporta. Why? Because the imagination is disorder'd at the same time as the entrails, and hence arise all the different surprising phenomena of the hysteric and hypochondriac affections.... A nothing, a minute fibre, something too subtle for the nicest anatomy, would have made two dunces of Erasmus and Fontenelle, as the latter himself observes in one of his most ingenious dialogues." 6 La Mettrie mentions the effects of food, heredity, environment, climate and education on the individual and consequently on conduct. Our virtues and our vices are the outcome of our constitution. " I cannot help thinking," he says, "that man is sufficiently punished, who has had the misfortune not to be born virtuous": and speaking of certain criminals whose misdeeds appeared to him to be consequent upon mental disorder: "Of these women one of them was broke on the wheel and burnt, and another was bury'd alive. I am sensible that the interest of society requires all this rigour. But, however, it is much to be wish'd that we had none for judges but the most skilful physicians. They alone could distinguish the guilty from the innocent. If reason is the slave of depraved, or distracted sense, how then can it be expected that at that time it should be governor ? " We have advanced some way towards that desirable consummation, it maybe admitted; but it can scarcely be said that we have arrived.
La Mettrie also mentions the case of Pascal-" If men are thus rack'd with the remembrance of their guilt, what occasion is there then to confound weak understandings and startle their imagination with the notions of hell, apparitions, and precipices of fire, that have less reality in them than those of Pascal." Of Pascal, it is noted that, "Either in company, or at table, he used always to have a kind of fence made of chairs, or some body close to his left hand, to hinder him from seeing the frightful abysses, into wbich he was sometimes afraid of falling, notwithstanding he knewperfectly well that this was all an illusion. What a frightful effect of the 5 " In Search of the Soul," by Bernard Hollander, M.D. Vol. i, p. 153. 6 La Mettrie. Op. cit., pp. 7, 8 and 19. imagination, or of a singular circulation in a lobe of the brain! As great a man as he was on the one hand, on the other he was half a fool." 7
It will be granted that La Mettrie had the root of the matter in him: and it may be that, in an age permitting greater liberty of expression, he would have still further expanded his doctrines. It is to be reckoned to his credit that he should have noted -and given reasons for his belief-that intellectual deterioration follows bodily enfeeblement, and have thence drawn the inference that thought is a result or product of organic processes. It is curious to observe that the fanatical Marat, himself an interesting psychiatric study, was a caustic critic of La Mettrie.8 Littre, physician and philologist, his pupil, Brachet, also distinguished as a philologist, Ernest Renan, Taine and Michelet, were among those who realized the value of the application of medical knowledge in this respect. Michelet laid great stress on material factors. For example, in writing of Louis XIV-and adopting the phrase of an earlier historian-he divides his life-history into the periods "before and after the fistula": and modifies the famous formula "L'Etat, c'est moi " as "L'Etat, c'est mon pouls et mon ventre! " 9 The same rationalistic spirit is exemplified in his study of the witchcraft delusion, entitled "The Sorceress." 10 Taine was, according to Cabanes, "one of the first, if not actually the first, of historians who attempted to apply clinical methods to History": from his early days he was interested in the study of physiology, anatomy, and, above all, of mental pathology, which he studied at the Salpetriere, under Baillarger. Taine himself says that between psychology, as he conceives it, and "history as it is now written, the relationship is very close. For history is applied psychology, psychology as applied to more complex cases. The historian notes and traces the total transformations presented by a particular human molecule or group of human molecules, and, to explain these transformations, writes the psychology of the molecule or group; Carlyle has written that of Cromwell; Sainte-Beuve that of Port Royal; Stendahl has made twenty attempts on that of the Italians; M. Renan has given us that of the Semitic race. Every perspicacious and philosophical historian labours at that of a man, an epoch, a people, or a race; the researches of linguists, mythologists and ethnographers have no other aim; the task is invariably the description of a human mind, or of the characteristics common to a group of human minds." 11 There will be found in Taine's volume numerous references to morbid psychology; and he refers to the hallucinations of Socrates, Tasso, Luther, Blake, Bunyan and of Th6ophile Gautier. 12 Littr tells us that he spent ten years in the hospitals, but did not gain any medical degree. He had to give up these studies because of the death of his father, which entailed upon him not only the necessity of earning his own living, but also of providing for his mother. But he never lost his interest in medical matters: he was able to apply this knowledge to good effect when dealing with certain historical problems, and, what particularly interests us here, to shed the light of reason and of science on such products of ignorance, superstition, or mental disorder, as the dancing manias, spiritualism, witchcraft and sorcery.13 7 La Mettrie. Op. cit., pp. 43-44. Note.-I have qu-oted rather extensively from La Mettrie, not only because of the interest of what he says, but also because, I imagine, he is little known and his writings are not easy of access. One final quotation may be permitted: "Fish have big heads, indeed, but void of sense; as are the heads of a greater part of mankind!" 8 " L'Histoire Eclairee par la Clinique," Dr. Cabanes. (Paris, n.d.). 9 Cabanbs. Op. cit., pp. 179 and 182. 
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Brachet, without the specialized training of Littre, was nevertheless a worthy disciple-certainly as far as industry and zeal were concerned. His interest in mental pathology and morbid heredity is well exemplified in his great work on the " Mental Pathology of the Kings of France," dealing with Louis XI and his ancestors through six centuries."4
Another masterly work is that entitled " De la Folie " by Dr. Calmeil, formerly physician at Charenton, published in 1845. Starting from the fifteenth century he brings his study down to the period when mesmerism was rife, just prior to the time of the French Revolution. He, too, shows quite clearly how many unfortunate mad folk were put to death in various ways: " Visionaries," people who were said to be possessed by, or women who cohabited with, demons, others who stated that they had eaten human flesh, lyeanthropes, or those who were supposed to turn into wolves, etc.'5
In our own time the tradition of L6lut and Littre has been most admirably maintained by one writer whose name must inevitably be mentioned in this connection. This is Dr. Caban6s, who, with indomitable energy, has explored so many of the medical by-ways of history. A mere list of his writings would occupy much space; it amounts to some forty volumes and forms quite an encyclopaedia of interesting information. Napoleon, Marat, Balzac, Tasso, Calvin, Gilles de Rais (sadist and prototype of Blue-Beard), mental disorder in kings and rulers, such as Emperor Charles V, Don Carlos, and others of the Spanish Monarchy, the Romanovs, tho Hohenzollerns and the Wittelsbachs-these are but a few of the topics with which he has dealt.
Pride of place has been given to these French writers because it is from them that the movement for a more rational and scientific consideration of such matters has received its chief impetus. It is to be remembered, however, that the school of English philosophy has had much-and admitted-influence upon French thought; and, indeed, upon thought elsewhere as well. Instead of the vagueness of the Scholastics, and in place of systems built up for the most part of phraseology, Bacon wished to build a fabric of human knowledge on " Experience or perception through induction." '6 This was bound to lead to scepticism in so far as many of the old beliefs were concerned, in much the same way that the philosophic doubt of Montaigne did. That such scepticism was necessary no reasonable or thoughtful person will deny-though others may. As Hume says in speaking of miracles-" We soon learn that there is nothing mysterious or supernatural in the case, but that all proceeds from the usual propensity of mankind towards the marvellous, and that, though this inclination may at intervals receive a check from sense and learning, it can never be thoroughly extirpated from human nature." 17 It was to be expected that the movement initiated by the French School would not long have to wait for followers in England and elsewhere. Mention should be made of the valuable work on mental disorders"8 by Griesinger, which appeared in 1845, and in which he dealt with them from a rational (physiological and pathological), as opposed to a metaphysical, point of view. One biographer speaks of him as " the pioneer in the development of medical psychology."9 Griesinger was, however, more concerned with the explanation of mental disorders than in the 14 " Pathologie mentale des Rois application of the knowledge thus gained to cognate matters. Not that he overlooked these, but that he touched upon them incidentally. There were two writers in England who did concern themselves quite definitely with this particular matter. These were Dr. W. H. Ireland and Dr. Henry Maudsley.
In Dr. Ireland's two books, "The Blot on the Brain" and "Through the Ivory Gate," there is much interesting information, dealing, in particular, with the Insanity of Power, as manifested, for example, in the Claudian-Julian line (Juliuis Cas%ar, Tiberius, Caligula, Nero) and in Ivan the Terrible (who well-merited the cognomen). Of Dr. Mlaudsley's writings special mention should, in this connection, be made of his " Natural Causes and Supernatural Seemings." The title gives a quite definite indication of the doct,rine which he set out to teach. Dr. Maudsley says that " an attack on supernaturalism, however absolute, is not an attack on religion," for " systems of theology are one thing, religion is another thing"; but, so far, it has not been possible to separate them, as is demonstrated by the fact that attacks on -supernaturalism and superstition are apt to be regarded as attacks on religion, so closely are they inter-related. It is easy to understand what Dr. Maudsley had in mind, but one fears there is little likelihood that his eminently reasonable opinion will soon meet with general acceptance. Indeed, he was bitterly attacked for his, so-called, anti-Christian teaching. 20 Was it probable that a scientific thinker who approximated the visions and " voices" of prophets, seers, and founders of religions, to those of the mentally disordered, could be popular with the enthusiasts and the true-believers who regarded these phenoinena as an integral part of their various systems of belief ?
To many it may seem that this subject is of merely academic interest and of no practical value. It is stated of the present age-and, so far as one can judge of previous ages-that it has no interest in anything which has not a strict utilitarian value. The statement is no more true now than it was formerly. The multitudes who visit cinemas, theatres, race-meetings, football matches, and so on, are sufficient to confute this. Despite the cynics, it is easy to prove that such things have a definite value, at any rate up to a point. 2[ From the purely academic point of view, however, there is the surpassing interest of searching for -the actual causes of phenomena, following one's refusal to force facts into line with ill-founded theories. The puirsuit of truth is of itself a pleasant thing. We may enjoy the hard-fought game we lose more than the victory achieved too easily; in any case we probably learn more from it.
It has been said that history repeats itself. This is never so, but similarity of conditions may make it appear as though such repetition occurs. That being so, and comparing conditions at a given time with those of the past we may learn what course it is wise to follow and what errors to avoid. In this we are further helped by reflecting that, through the annals of recorded history, there appears to have been no change in human nature, or, if any, the change is so little as to be, from a practical point of view, negligible. 22 We still flatter ourselves, 20 See, for example, " Christian Psychology," by T. M. Gorman, M.A. (London, 1875) . 21 It is so easy to sneer and to adopt a " superior" attitude towards these that I hasten to disclaim any such implication. It was the same in classic times when " bread and circuses " were the topic. On the other hand, there is the great difference between use and abuse. "What virtue is there which, carried to excess, does not become a vice." (Maudsley.) 22 In one of his " Dialogues "-between Socrates and Montaigne-Fontenelle makes Montaigne say that men " are like birds, caught in the very same snares wherein have been taken a hundred thousand more of their species. There is no one who does not enter life wholly new, the stupidities of the father are not the least use to their children." Montaigne goes on to say that "man degenerates." Whereto Socrates answers: "Be on youir guard . . . man elevates the men of old time to abase his contemporaries. When we lived we overestimated our forebears, anid now our posterity esteems us more than our due, and quite rightly. I think the world would be very tedious if one saw it with perfect precision, for it is always the same." And later he adds: "Clothes change, but that does not mean a change in the shape of the body . . . the heart does not change and man is all in the heart." XTranslation by Ezra Pound, London, 1917.) as did our forebears in the distant days of Plato and Aristotle, that our acts are dominated by reason and that intellect and "will" are our prime movers, whereas the truth would seem to be that it is the emotions which are predominant. 23
Not only this, but one individual differs from another only in degree and not in kind. So trained are we to hero-worship that we are apt to regard our heroes as supermen, or as being in some way supernormal. It is a shock to us when we find that they, too, have their frailties and their foibles, that even our gods have feet of clay. But, if " to understand all means to pardon all," the knowing is worth while; for, while our veneration may be tempered, our human sympathies are evoked. Nor need we admire great qualities the less because here and there we find some alloy. It may be that, as with precious metals, a base admixture gives stay and reinforcement for its particular purpose. Now, it is these imperfections, or alloys, which historians and biographers are often incapable of appreciating at their proper value, owing to bias or wrong preconceptions, or through lack of specialized knowledge. Let us take a specific example. Were Joan of Arc's visions atnd voices divine or diabolic ? The opinion of many contemporary scholars, clerical and lay, was that she was a trafficker with the devil-and she was burned as a witch. Political bias may have had a good deal to do with the decision, but the belief was there nevertheless. Then, after many years come the rehabilitation and the canonization. Will the time come when this in turn will be reversed? On the shifting sands of opinion no solid or lasting structuire of truth can be based. Even in those days there were people, though they were few in number, who realized that there was no need to invoke the supernatural to account for these phenomena. But, unless they were unusually brave or foolhardy, they kept their opinions discreetly to themselves. Stake and faggot were, for the individual, unanswerable arguments! Even though they themselves be not comipetent to weigh the evidence in these matters, biograpbers and historians are apt to resent what they regard as the impertinent intrusion of others, better qualified. It is a curious trait in human nature in this respect that, though it will permit, or even welcome, a diagnosis of physical disease suffered by some famous person, it is a different matter when the disorder is mental. This would seem to arise from two considerations. First, that in deciding upon a question of insanity, lay and medical opinions are of equal value-a view that seems implicit in the law. This does not apply to any extent to cases coming within the layman's more intimate personal knowledge-if the patient be a worry or burden to him, for then he is glad to invoke expert assistance. Secondly, there is the underlying fear of insanity and the insane, which is, maybe, instinctive, but which has not been diminished by Christian tradition.
These criticisms do not, of course, apply to all historians or to all biographers. There are notable exceptions: for example, Lecky, author of the " History of Rationalism," " History of European Morals," etc., Lytton Strachey and others. But instances will occur to the minds of most people where the writing of history has been coloured by prejudice or by party feeling.
It may seem hypercritical to comment thus on writers who have shown such painstaking industry, but the criticism really is in respect of certain sins of omission-the more flagrant because of their usually vital significance. It may be frankly admitted that a person who should seek to deal adequately with the subject would need to be almost omniscient-historian, biographer, physiologist and psychiatrist rolled into one! He would have to go back to the sources-search archives, read diaries, autobiographies, anything and everything that might possibly throw light on the subject. This brings us to the consideration of what it is wise or necessary to include in volumes of reminiscences, biographies, etc. The complaint is often made that writers dwell too much on irrelevant details, trivialities, scandals, tittle-tattle, and the complaint is largely justified. Even so, it too often happens that items of information, apparently trivial, though really important, are omitted. Again and again we experience the same thing in our daily practice! Yet it is this attention to details which renders the works of writers such as Plutarch and Suetonius so invaluable to us now. It was Plutarch's express purpose to delineate character; had he been alive to limn for us the features of Cromwell, he would not have forgotten to paint in the warts ! We could afford to sacrifice a good many historical works in order to possess the " Lives of the Twelve C(esars." As Montaigne says, the true way to understand men of great reputation would be to know how they behaved at home and not at the head of their armies: and Bacon-" A man's nature is best perceived in privateness, for there is no affectation; in passion, for that putteth a man out of his precepts: and in a new case or experiment, for there custom leaveth him." 24 It is to be remembered that events are important to us as human beings only in as far as they relate to individuals, and as influencing the course of human life, however much we may try to obscure this fact. To quote Bacon once more: " Individuals are the object of history"; or, as Carlyle put it, " History is a collection of biographies."
Yet the biographer's lot is not a happy one in certain respects. If he tells all the truth about contemporaries he nmay render himself liable to actions for libel, or to prosecution for indecency ! Nevertheless, the facts should be given somehow, though only a change in public opinion in the direction of a reasonable appreciation of scientific needs will make their presentation generally possible. Meantime, for the most part, we continue to suffer from unnecessary frankness in fiction and undue reticence in fact.
Incidental references have been made to some of the practical applications of psychiatric methods, but some amplification of these will serve more fully to demonstrate their utility and interest. One of the most gloomy chapters in history is that which deals with witchcraft and sorcery. The Christian conception-or adoption-of the idea of the Devil, or Prince of Darkness, and the general tendency to attribute everything unexplained, and apparently inexplicable, to supernatural agencies, tended to foster other irrational conceptions. 25 If there was a Devil, it was a logical sequence that there would be compacts with him by people who wished to avail themselves of his maleficent powers. This delusion was not, of course, necessarily an insane one; and, indeed, there were many people who else were of high intellectual degree, yet who did, nevertheless, hold with these childish superstitions. Sir Thomas Browne is a good example; he could write on " Vulgar Errors" and yet be unable to disabuse his mind of this particular one. We need not be surprised at this when we consider our own time. As witches were in the air-the expression may be permitted as a not inappropriate one-the belief was certain to be adopted by the insane and by the half-mad; and they, in their turn, were regarded as outcasts and criminals when they admitted that they had made compacts with the Devil, had attended the Witches' Sabbath, and so on. Hallucinations of sight, hearing, smell, or of the muscular sense, hysteria, catalepsy, somnambulism and nightmare, gave rise in the individual to the belief that strange things had been happening to him. When we add to this a little torture still further to upset the mental balance, there is no wonder that the learned gentlemen who made lengthy records of their examinations of these poor creatures had some amazing details to pass on to posterity. 26 So prevalent and firmly rooted were these beliefs that it is not less amazing that rational and scientific opinions could ever overcome them. It does seem, however, that there must be some powerful urge in human nature, or in some parts of it, towards the light of truth. The greatest gain in this respect was when freedom of discussion was achieved, or happened. Yet that stage had not been reached when people like John Wier, 27 a medical man and physician to the Duke of Cleves, boldly brought his knowledge to bear on the gross credulities displayed in the " Malleus Maleficarum " and wrote his " De praestigiis demonum " (1563); and when Reginald Scot carried on the work of enlightenment in his " Discoverie of Witchcraft" (1584). For King James I was an upholder of tradition in this respect, as may be gathered from a perusal of his " Daemonologie " (1597) and from the fact that he promulgated a law against witchcraft. He attacked both Wier and Scot; while the scholarly Bodin also bitterly criticised Wier in his " D6monomanie des Sorciers" (1580). In spite of the forces against it scepticism was not extinguished-fortunately for the victims of " belief." 28 * Consideration of the treatment meted out to witches brings recognition of the fact that increasing knowledge of morbid mental processes must lead to a change of view in regard to matters criminal. If many of the so-called witches were really mentally disordered and deluded, or. at least, eccentric, it followed that they could not fitly be treated as dangerous criminals, as had been the case in many instances. It began gradually to be realized that insanity was more multiplex than had been imagined when it was sufficient to speak of " possession," or something of the kind, and leave it at that. So it came about that the state of mind of the criminal was more studied; though progress in this direction has been slow because of the difficulty in arriving at any reasonable conception of what that "mind" is! The desire to cling to the doctrine of the absolute freedom of the will was and still is undoubtedly an obstacle. Yet it is good to know that, in practice, it is more and more accepted that a variety of factors can and do vitiate, or impair, this freedom and, consequently, the responsibility of the individual for his actions. It is possible, therefore, that some of those who were dealt with as criminals in olden times would now be regarded as being ill-balanced or definitely insane. For example, Ravaillac, who stabbed Henry IV; Jacques Clement, who assassinated Henry III; Damiens, who attempted to kill Louis XV, and who was made to undergo such atrocious tortures that Michelet said he provided the most striking example for physiology of what a man could suffer without dying! Recognition of the symptoms of mental disorder and means of dealing adequately with the sufferers might sometimes have diverted the course of world events. History does show that it is not wise for individuals to have unbridled power. If they are fairly stable mentally they may be able to withstand the dangers which autocracy implies: if not, the consequences may be disastrous. Insanity, often enough troublesome in the private individual, may be a menace or he attended by horrific results in the case of the tyrant and the despot. Examples of this were easy to adduce: and it will be sufficient to mention the names of Nero, Tiberius, Caligula, Ivan the Terrible, Peter the Great. Revolutions, also, seem inevitably to bring to the surface mad fanatics, sadists, alcoholics, who, in their turn, become responsible for the worst excesses: without such opportunities they might have lived comparatively innocuous lives.
Bodily disorders of all kinds have their inevitable reverberations in the nervous system and, therefore, on mental processes. How far, then, are these responsible 27 Wier was probably influenced by the teachings of Henry Cornelius Agrippa, of Nettesheim, whose "De Vanitate, etc." (" Of the Vanity of the Arts and Sciences ") was published in 1529.
28 It is to be remembered that there was wickedness as well as insanity. A noimber of the accused did douibtless indulge in nefarious practices, and were impostors, purveyors of poisons, and were evil-livers and evil-doers, but we are concerned here with those unfortunates who were mentally disordered. for alterations in conduct ? There are, at least, two aspects from which this problem must be considered-the disease and the temperament or constitution of the sufferer. Judge Jeffreys, of unenviable notoriety, suffered from vesical calculus. Partly, perhaps, to assuage his sufferings in this respect he drank heavily. Would his lifehistory not have been very different if be had had proper treatment ? Calvin, again, suffered from stone, which fact may well have influenced his theological outlook. Henry VIII was syphilitic; so was Francis I of France. As contrasted cases of individuals suffering from the same disease-phthisis-we may consider Robert Louis Stevenson and D. H. Lawrence. In the former there were optimism, urbanity, delight in the thought of high adventure, a predilection for the objective side of life -in a word he was, it may be hazarded, an individual whom Jung would describe as an extravert. In the case of D. H. Lawrence there would appear to be an almost opposite tendency-to excessive introspection, to dwell unduly upon sex until it seemed to become an obsession, toward pessimism and a misanthropic attituderather, indeed, like Swift, who finally passed over the borderland into insanity. There was a rather similar tendency to dwell on the morbid and gloomy in the case of the Bronte sisters, in whose family tuberculosis was very prevalent. It would be an easy matter to add examples to such a list, but it is unnecessary here.29 The fact to be remembered in these, as in other cases, is the influence of bodily disorders upon character and conduct. It is impossible airily to dismiss them as irrelevant and unimportant. Anyone who is irnelined to do so would do well to remember what his outlook upon the world was while suffering from sea-sickness, " biliousness," haemorrhoids, influenza, or colic! La Mettrie certainly understood their significance. He instances a magistrate in Switzerland who was, " when fasting, the most upright and merciful judge; but woe to the wretch who came before him when he had made a hearty dinner. He was then disposed to hang everybody, the innocent as well as the guilty." 30 The day for disbelief in " vulgar errors " has not yet dawned: nor does it seem as if that day will ever come-if one may judge from current events and beliefs. If we have almost got rid of superstitious ideas regarding witchcraft and demoniacal possession we still have spiritualism.
Whatever truth there may be in the spiritualistic conceptions there is no doubt that they are accompanied by much trickery, fraud even, and, what interests us here, great emotional instability, which does, not infrequently, pass on into definite mental disorder. The " spirit voices " may then be auditory hallucinations. It is necessary to remember this when reading accounts of those with well-developed " mediumistic " powers. As Dr. Mercier pointed out, there is just as much-or as little-cause for believing in witchcraft as in spiritualism,31 and he called attention once again to the aphorism enunciated by William of Occam some six hundred years ago, that "Miracle is not to be presumed until natural causes have been excluded."
Although a considerable amount of critical and explanatory work has already been accomplished-what has been said here will, it is hoped, make this plain-there still remains much to be done. Even where it is admitted that mental disease was present in some individual, it is none the less interesting to endeavour to decide precisely what was the particular disorder from which he or she suffered. In the case of William Blake, the painter and poet, there does not appear to be any doubt that he was of the manic-depressive type,32 and the same may be said of Friedrich Nietzsche.33 William Cowper, the poet, may be included in this 29 Those who would like to puirsue the matter further, may read with profit the following: "Post Mortem " and " Mere Mortals," by C. MacLaurin, M.B., F.R.C.S.Ed., and the " Biographic Clinics," by George M. Gould, M.D. 30 April, 1915. 33 Friedrich Nietzsche, Journal of Mental Science, January, 1915. category, though he seemed to be rather an example of recurrent melancholia, with suicidal impulses, and there were no well-marked manic phases corresponding in any degree with the depressive one. August Strindberg, novelist and dramatist, is an interesting case for study, and much valuable autobiographical material is to be found in his writings. But the range of the subject is vast, and, indeed, it is difficult, the more one studies it, to see who is to be excluded rather than who is to be included! When we realize that much of the best, or, at any rate, the most impressive work in the world is the product of individuals in a state of unstable nervous equilibrium, it is not difficult to conceive that there may be times in their lives when the balance tends to become upset, and when they may even be definitely disordered mentally.34 It is not a question of them all being insane-or even of becoming insane at any particular time-but there may be, as Mercier so frequently pointed out, mental disorder without definite, or " certifiable," insanity. To describe some of these individuals it may be better to employ the term suggested by Landouzy, of " disharmonics," or persons who are out of harmony with their social conditions, temporarily, it may be. It is obviously more fitting to apply such a term to such individuals as Socrates, Luther, Pascal, Descartes, Mahomet and Bunyan. Often only a fine line exists between their disorders and actual insanity: it is a question of degree. The mistake which is made is to impute the disorder to some supernatural or preternatural cause. For this there is no warrant. It would not be done by anyone who could apply an adequate knowledge of mental disorders to the problems under consideration.
